"I Am The Table"

See here for an upsetting view of material objects, like tables, that we have neglected to discuss. If you dare.

"Personal" Identity: They're Made of Meat?!

We have been focused on the following questions: (roughly) How many material things are there? How do they survive change (if in fact they do)?

This naturally raises other questions, closer to home; questions that are often grouped under the issue of personal identity: What am I? Am I material or not? Do I survive change? If so, how do I manage it?

Some have even been tempted by this question: What is it in virtue of which baby-me is identical to grown-up-me?

Fwiw, I'm rather impersonal about identity; I think it's just that binary relation, governed by Leibniz's Law, that everything bears to itself and never to anything else. But that's just me. And I'm a philosopher. And philosophers, on the whole, don't have an excellent track record in being right about things. So maybe I'm not right about that. But given that I think what I do about identity, I think at least the last question above is a bad question. Briefly, here's why. (This argument is due to Nathan Salmon, a keynote speaker at the most recent meeting for the Society for Exact Philosophy.) The last question asks what it is in virtue of which x at t = y at t*. So since identity is not temporally relative (on the simple view I stated), this question amounts to asking what it is in virtue of which x = y. Now if x is distinct from y, then there is nothing in virtue of which x = y. But if x = y, then the fact that x = y is the very same fact as the fact that x = x. So the question amounts to asking: What is it in virtue of which x = x? Less symbolically, what makes it the case that you are you (and not something else)? What has to be the case in order for you not to be Stephen Harper? What do you have to do to not be him? The only sensible answer I can discern is: Not Much. So I think the last question is not a good question.

The earlier ones are, however. But we are not specifically concerned with persons in this course. We deal with them if they are material, but we deal instead with their material bodies if they are not. Still, there are good questions of personal identity. And I'm willing to bet these questions have occurred to you and you are interested in their answers. See here for an accessible dialogue on what sorts of things we are. (It touches on a lot of issues we touch on, so it's good to check out regardless.) See here for a clever expression of amazement at the suggestion that we are material. (And for that matter, the sort of material we are, given that we are material!)

I'm happy to have an 'Are we souls or what?' free-for-all here, since we're not focusing on that in class. So: Are we souls, or what?

The Nugget View

One "picture" of how objects last over time is by having a special part: a "nugget" or Chisholm object. In 'What Physical Thing am I?' Roderick Chisholm provides a brief defence of this view. (Just scroll down a bit after hitting the link to get to the relevant part. It's a meager three pages.)

Class Visitor: Dan Korman!

Great news: Prof. Dan Korman, who is giving our first Philosophical Fridays talk of the year on Friday afternoon, at 2:30 in 395 UC, has agreed to come to our class on Friday and talk about his take on the paradoxes of material objects that we have been discussing! To preview a little bit, Dan is a proponent of the "coincidence picture" we've been talking about. He's planning to say a bit about why he thinks that's the way to go, discuss some further problems for coincidence theorists, and open the floor for questions. It would be best to save any questions about his afternoon talk (draft available by emailing me) until after the afternoon talk. But this is a great opportunity to ask questions about coincidence and matters concerning material objects in general from a world expert! Other issues that would be fair game for class discussion are those that come up in his papers that we plan to read later in the term. So please start thinking of questions for Prof. Korman!

Arguments

Professor Cullison has posted some handouts on arguments. Since they bear an eerie similarity to what we discussed in class, I thought I would link to them in case they are helpful.

Shedboatshed

Here. Not quite a puzzle of material constitution, but pretty close!

'Material Object'

Today the following question came up: What is a material object?

Surprisingly, there has not been a lot of work done on this. Assuming 'material object' is pretty much interchangeable with 'physical object', you can look at Ned Markosian's 'Physical Object' for some quick (3 page) thoughts. See his "What Are Physical Objects?" for a more thorough discussion.

Any suggestions on what physical objects are?

The Growing Argument

Hi All,

Here is the argument we discussed today:

1. If M is a material object, then M is identical to the sum S of material particles that compose M at time t.
2. If M is identical to the sum S of material particles that compose M at t, then M is always distinct from any sum S* that is distinct from S.
3. So, if M is a material object, then M is always distinct from any sum S* that is distinct from S.
4. If M is always distinct from any sum S* that is distinct from S, then M never survives the gain or loss of any parts.
5. So, if M is a material object, then M never survives the gain or loss of any parts.

Here is some support for its premises:
Support for 1. Assume M is material. Then it seems the only option for M is for it to be (identical to) some (hunk of or sum of) matter. So (1) is true.

Support for 2. Assume the antecedent. The consequent then follows provided strict identity is not temporary: if ever x = y, then always x = y (or at least whenever x or y exist). This may sound surprising, but I don’t think it should. Recall strict identity is governed by Leibniz’s Law. Now suppose x used to be distinct from y, but later on will not be. Then x has the following property: it used to be distinct from y. But y lacks that property. But LL says if x = y, then Fx iff Fy. Since they differ in their properties, it cannot be the case that they are strictly identical. So identity is not temporary. So 2 is true.

Support for 3. Subconclusion.

Support for 4. Assume antecedent. Suppose M gained or lost a part. Then we would be considering another sum S* that is distinct from S. M can’t be S* since M is identical to S. So 4 is true.

Finally, here's what we said about identity:
Identical: Strict, literal identity. Not like “identical” twins. Like 4 is identical to the sum of 2 and 2. Identity is a two-place logical relation governed by Leibniz’s Law: if x = y, then Fx iff Fy (x and y have all of the same properties).

Some good suggestions came up in class concerning where things might be going wrong. Other thoughts?

And One More Thing . . .

Please read the Pryor pieces linked below the meiosis. They are short and excellent. Have a great weekend!

Welcome!

Welcome to the class blog for Philosophy 2580: Metaphysics. Please explore the links under the picture.